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Contemporary scholarship in various academic spheres has often 
perceived the epistemological domains within the Arts and 
Humanities as obsolete and irrelevant to the contemporary 
development paradigm. Instead, disciplines which promise 
immediate and practical results are preferred as significant and 
appropriate. Contrary to this popular perception, the present paper 
reflects on the relevance of the Socratic elenchus to the 21st 
century knowledge processes, especially in developing countries. 
The Socratic elenchus is regarded both as a philosophy and 
method. The contention is that the Socratic elenchus which 
epitomizes critical thinking, which is itself the core of the Arts 
and Humanities disciplines, is in fact more significant and 
relevant in today’s world affairs which are becoming more 
complex than ever before. Such relevance is not limited to the 
Arts and Humanities alone. Hence, to demonstrate this assertion, 
the paper reflects on the Socratic elenchus, which is not only a 
philosophically interesting method, but also relevant to a broad 
spectrum of knowledge processes in the contemporary 
developmental paradigm. The Socratic elenchus, named after the 
classical Greek philosopher Socrates, is a form of inquiry and 
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dialogue between individuals, based on question and answer 
technique to stimulate a critical stance that illuminates the often-
taken-for-granted ideas. The Socratic elenchus provides a model 
of critical thinking, which is itself a very indispensable cognitive 
skill of all times. The development of a more erudite, astute and 
alert mind is of critical importance. Such a mind is more 
prepared, and so in tune to understand and confront problems of 
the contemporary sophisticated universe which is characterized 
by large volumes of information.  
Keywords:  Socratic Elenchus, Humanities and Arts, 
Contemporary Development Paradigm, Knowledge 
Processes. 
1. The question of knowledge and its relevance 
Over the past two decades or so, most disciplines in the Arts and Humanities 
have come under immense pressure to justify their continued existence within 
the education curriculum at almost all levels. The Arts and Humanities have 
often been perceived as disciplines that are irrelevant for the contemporary 
development paradigm. For this reason, and therefore in an attempt to appear 
relevant, many disciplines within the Arts and Humanities have preoccupied 
themselves with adoption of methodological approaches from science and 
technology to bear upon their different activities. With this adoption alone, the 
Arts and Humanities seem to concede the irrelevance of their courses. 
Alternatively, it could just be a way of surviving in such a harsh and 
competitive academic environment. While this perception is slowly becoming 
entrenched in many people’s thinking, and in fact it has become a popular 
basis for a number of political ideologies, no one has really challenged and 
questioned whether the so-called contemporary development paradigm 
represents a comprehensive articulation of the whole range of basic human 
needs, some of which are by far ably articulated in the Arts and Humanities. 
From such accusations one thing is clear: that the relevance or value of any 
knowledge must be validated by what it can contribute to human development. 
It seems therefore that knowledge from the Arts and Humanities lacks that 
quality.  





For the sake of argument, when we talk of relevance of knowledge, we usually 
refer to expectations attached to a piece of knowledge. If a piece of knowledge 
is irrelevant, it is dropped. It could be argued therefore that relevance is a 
factor that motivates people to engage in their pursuit of knowledge of a 
particular kind. If this is correct, then Aristotle’s observation that man is by 
nature an inquisitive being, seeking knowledge (Adler, 1997: 79), has been 
contradicted. Knowing is in this case no longer regarded as a natural human 
tendency, but an activity actually motivated by relevance. Granted this were 
the case, can we say there is some knowledge which is irrelevant? However, if 
it is agreeable that man is by nature an inquisitive being, then it can be argued 
that the fact that it (some idea) is knowable, then it is relevant. Otherwise it 
would be unknowable. In his speech to the British parliament, David Willetts, 
the UK Minister for Universities and Science from 2010 to 2014, underscored 
the value of the Humanities and Social Sciences by stating that “every really 
big issue needs to be looked at from the perspective of different disciplines” 
(Willets, 2011: np.). Before they become a means to something else, 
disciplines are fundamentally worthwhile in and of themselves. Similarly, in 
its AHRC Strategy 2013 – 2018, the Arts & Humanities Council has singled 
out the Arts and Humanities’ key contribution to the life of a nation as that of 
helping humanity tap into a long tradition of engagement with key ideas that 
have shaped the contemporary world. 
Since today the value of knowledge is commonly perceived to consist in its 
usefulness for the development processes, and not for its own sake, further 
inquiry can be made into what exactly development consists in so that it 
becomes a determining factor for knowledge. From what can be gathered in 
terms of popular perceptions, development means ‘development of things’ that 
help human beings meet their basic needs which in turn improve the quality of 
their lives (Sumner, 2006: 645). Basic needs include housing, food, health, 
and many more. Some prefer to call them survival needs. But development 
which could be described as a process (dynamic course of change) or a state 
(static condition) has to do with the quality of life, and that in itself could 
mean a lot more things. For instance, it could mean the ability to manipulate 
information to one’s advantage. What this means is that development is not 






anything else, for human survival. The fulfilment of basic needs should be 
able to free someone towards greater heights of achievements. That is now 
quality life.  
There is a general consensus that knowledge leads to a more fulfilled and 
sustainable development (see Brøther, 2013; Okolie, 2003). However, 
knowledge is considered as more of a continuous process than a product of 
cognitive processes. Some have argued that a teaching strategy that lays 
emphasis on the process of arriving at an answer rather than simply requiring 
students to be able to regurgitate and interrogate the ‘right’ answer, whether or 
not they understand the answer or its justification, is more important as its 
inherent dynamism allows students to construct their own knowledge (Lutz, 
1996: 41). Indeed that process opens up to more opportunities of choices. As 
the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Human Development 
Report (1990: 1) observes, enlarging people’s choices is in itself an aspect of 
development. Human development can therefore be said to be a process of 
enlarging people's choices where “the most critical of these wide-ranging 
choices are to live a long and healthy life, to be educated, and to have access 
to resources needed for a decent standard of living. Additional choices include 
political freedom, guaranteed human rights and personal self-respect.”   
In developing a model for assessing human development, Martha Nussbaum 
proposes “Capabilities Approach” in which she sees “Human Development 
Approach” as the creation or enlargement of one’s opportunities (Nussbaum, 
2011:  17). As an approach to comparative quality-of-life assessment, and to 
theorizing about social justice, development is not just about the total or 
average well-being but about the opportunities available to each person. In so 
doing, the approach respects each person as an end where freedom of choice is 
guaranteed and maximized. This is more of substantive freedom than formal 
freedom. With this substantive freedom, a person may be able to choose 
actions that can truly be said to be theirs; those for which they can be held 
accountable. The approach also recognizes the plurality of values (Nussbaum, 
2011: 18). So, knowledge provides one with greater capability or freedom for 
making choices. One cannot make a choice without knowledge of what is to 
be chosen over and above other alternatives. It is in this sense that some 
contend, and rightly so, that satisfaction of basic needs is not sufficient, and 





cannot single-handedly harness the constitutive elements of human 
development. 
Science and technology have had an enormous influence on the thinking of the 
contemporary society. These epistemological domains have assumed a great 
deal of power that influences decision making processes within the political 
and economic domains. The scientific and technological discourse has 
permeated and shaped the structure of our society. Many aspects of academic 
and educational policies are framed on the prospects of science and 
technology. In Malawi for example, the National Commission for Science and 
Technology (NCST) is supposed to be the umbrella body charged with 
spearheading various aspects of research in various epistemological domains. 
However, to be politically and economically correct, it places emphasis on 
science and technology, not only in its name but also its activities, although it 
is correct to think in my view, that technology applies to various aspects of 
knowledge, and not only science. NCST’s motto reads: “a nation with 
scientifically and technologically led sustainable growth and development” 
(http://www.ncst.mw/). Probably the term science is used both in the ordinary 
and specialized senses without clarifying. This makes it a wooly concept. 
Science could denote an approach to a research problems as is the case with 
social and human sciences. It could as well mean a specific sphere of enquiry. 
There is little doubt that the NCST uses either of these conceptions of science 
in a way that is convenient to its operations without having to be labored to 
make it explicit. Although this is the case, more critical questions can be 
raised concerning the current dominance of science and technology in various 
aspects of human life. Is scientific and technological discourse the end to the 
endless questioning by human beings? Is it the alternative of alternatives by 
which human beings can realize their true selves and worth? Are science and 
technology the destiny for which human intellect has naturally tended?  
Science and technology, although different and related among themselves, are 
but a distinct way to understanding nature, but not the way. They constitute 
particular ways of looking at the world. They cannot engage certain important 
issues concerning human existence such as beliefs which by their very nature 
cannot be proved or disproved by employing methods from a strictly natural 






beings, love, or the true purpose of life. The Arts and Humanities in general 
provide us with a distinct outlook of the world. Come to think of the sort of 
universe that various literary works depict. These so-called “non-scientific” 
domains are not only significant to humankind by themselves; they are also 
indispensable to some scientific spheres in as much as the scientific spheres 
are to other knowledge domains. Come to think of the significance of art in 
architectural designs. Although architecture is ordinarily perceived as 
belonging to the scientific domain, first and foremost, an architect is an artist 
who develops a mental picture of the object in his mind before it is actualized 
in the physical world by some technicians labelled as bricklayers, carpenters, 
plumbers or painters, among others. Hence, it is not in vain for some to claim 
that every piece of knowledge has relevance in its own way. It addresses a 
particular domain of human existence. Besides, all knowledge domains 
complement each other. It is in light of this consideration that this paper 
demonstrates the relevance of the Socratic elenchus in knowledge processes of 
the 21st century. 
2. The Socratic elenchus: A philosophy and method of the knowledge 
process 
The Socratic elenchus is generally considered as a system, method, an 
intellectual technique for philosophical enquiry. It is called “Socratic” because 
the historic Socrates is known to have used it more than anyone in his 
philosophical practice almost 2500 years ago. The elenchus is ubiquitous in, 
and characteristic of, the Platonic dialogues where the historical Socrates 
engages participants by going through several conversational stages. The 
stages that Socrates uses are (a) Wonder, (b) Hypothesis, (c) Elenchus 
(refutation and cross-examination), (d) Accept/reject the hypothesis, and, (e) 
Act accordingly, in that order (Boghossian, 2006: 44).  
In the dialogues, questions are asked in order to further define the idea in 
question. Socrates seeks definitions for the terms about which he inquired, 
starting with general questions and systematically narrowing down the 
inquiry. Secondly, hypotheses or responses to the question are offered by one 
or more participants in the dialogue. There is a variety of responses. Thirdly, 
elenchus (or elenchos), is at the heart of Socrates' dialogical practice. It is in 
the elenchus that, through a sort of cross-examination, Socrates offered 





counterexamples to the hypotheses of his interlocutors. The responses of his 
interlocutors are reduced to absurdity. What appeared as a genuinely correct 
response in the first place is not sufficiently sophisticated to escape the 
otherwise genuine concerns about its unsuitability (Boghossian, 2006:44). The 
counterexample provides an instance that may make the hypothesis offered 
false in light of new evidence. In other words, the hypothesis is brought to 
absurdity. In the domain of Logic, the argument of this kind is technically 
termed as a reductio ad absurdum. The elenchus examines the consistency 
between beliefs held by dialogue participants. Once inconsistencies are found, 
the participants are forced to refine their concepts. Question, answer and 
counterexamples are the defining characteristics for this stage of Socratic 
practice. Of course, it is not always the case that a counterexample is accepted 
(Boghossian, 2006: 45). Through hypothetical questions, absurdity becomes 
significant not only for forcing one to revise their hypothesis, but also for 
testing one’s mental strength in handling contrary beliefs, as they proceed with 
the dialogue. There are instances that some dialogue participants could not 
withstand Socrates’ provocative questioning, and often left the debate 
inconclusively as was the case with Euthyphro. Euthyphro is one of Plato’s 
dialogues whose setting depicts events occurring in the weeks before the trial 
of Socrates (399 BCE). They meet at the court where each awaits preliminary 
hearings about an imminent trial. Socrates engages Euthyphro in a discussion 
concerning the meaning of piety or virtue which is usually regarded as a 
manner of living which consists in the fulfilment of one's duty both to gods 
and to humanity. What is striking about this conversation is that instead of 
giving a precise definition of what piety or impiety is, Euthyphro merely gives 
instances of human actions which can be labeled pious or impious. Although 
the dialogue ends without one getting a glimpse of a satisfactorily precise 
meaning of piety, there is something crucial about it. It highlights the 
inconsistences and self-contradictions that characterise a lot of popular 
statements uttered without thinking about their logical implications. This is 
precisely one of the fruits of the Socratic elenchus, namely, the clarification of 
concepts used in any kind of dialogue (See Plato, 2015). 
But what exactly is the Socratic Elenchus? Scholars call Socrates’ method of 






examination (Boghossian, 2006: 44). It is an inquiry through which people 
reveal to themselves, discovering what the opinion they have held for so long 
on a particular subject really amounts to. The aim of the elenchus is not 
merely to reach adequate definitions of concepts, but it also has a moral 
function since regular elenctic philosophizing makes people happier and more 
virtuous than anything else. Socrates enabled those with whom he engaged in 
these dialogues descend into the inner-most depths of their own souls and 
create their own life through self-criticism. Hence it is impossible in many 
instances to know what we as human beings believe in until we engage others 
in dialogue. For us to discover our philosophical views, we must engage with 
ourselves, with the lives we already lead. Our views are dynamic as they form, 
change, and evolve, as we participate in this dialogue. Without intellectual 
dialogue human beings cannot discover what philosophical colours they 
harbour. At some point everyone preaches to himself and others what he does 
not yet practice. Until we engage in a dialogue with others, everyone acts in 
ways that are in some way contradictory or inconsistent with the views he or 
she confesses or professes to hold. More importantly, in the Platonic 
dialogues, Socrates is likened to a gadfly which stings men into consciousness. 
In this elenctic process, Socrates is also likened to an intellectual mid-wife 
who successfully conducts the birth of healthy ideas which the people of his 
time were not aware they possessed. By examining each single response from 
his interlocutors Socrates leads them to admit of their ignorance. Although the 
natural and immediate outcome of the elenchus is aporia, or confusion, the 
important thing is curiosity which leads people into seeking new knowledge or 
to refine their hypothesis. It is this desire to seek new knowledge that is crucial 
(Idachaba & Haaga, 2015: 35). 
Gregory Vlastos (1907-1991), a Turkish born scholar renowned for his 
dedicated philosophical commentaries on Socrates, considered the elenchus as 
“Socrates' main instrument of philosophical investigation” (Vlastos, 1982: 
711). He described Socrates’ method of inquiry as “among the greatest 
achievements of humanity” (Vlastos, 1971: 19). For Vlastos, the Socratic 
method of inquiry makes philosophy an ordinary human enterprise. Indeed, 
instead of engaging in an intellectual dispute about a suitable philosophical 
method, say analytical method, or any such specialized vocabulary, the 
Socratic method employs ordinary and common language that thrives in the 





public domain, as well as common sense. This is the case because living is 
ordinarily every person’s business. This method puts trust in human beings’ 
common sense as endowed with the great potential for self-understanding. 
Indeed, Socrates treated philosophy as an ordinary activity, a way of living. 
He considered it as something any ordinary person could do. With this simple 
technique, Socrates approached problems from many vantage points. Mention 
should be made that although this method of inquiry is called the Socratic 
method, Socrates himself never spelled out a method as such for this kind of 
intellectual activity. It is those who make commentary on Socratic works, such 
as Vlastos and others, who form the consensus that the elenchus typifies 
Socratic philosophy and its attendant method.  
Although the Socratic method is situated in the ordinary human domains of 
mental operation, it is not as simple as it is often presented by various 
scholars. On the contrary, it calls for the exercise of the highest degree of 
mental alertness of which anyone is capable. The use of Socratic elenchus 
demonstrates how concepts used in every day conversations not only lack 
universal agreement on their meaning, but also that every single person has a 
somewhat different opinion on each and every concept being used. In the 
Socratic method, it seems there is no concept – an abstract representation of 
reality – which is not intimately related to the most profoundly relevant human 
experiences. It is not the case, however, that the Socratic technique of 
philosophical enquiry lacks a system. On the contrary, the Socratic technique 
can be distinguished from non-systematic enquiries because of its attempt, in a 
sustained way, to explore the ramifications of certain opinions and then offer 
not only compelling objections, but also alternatives to them.  
This kind of inquiry is both adequately exhaustive and scrupulous, and in 
many ways resembles the debate that characterizes the works of Karl Popper 
(positivist), Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn (post-
positivists) in their contribution to Philosophy of Science, and specifically their 
views about the nature of scientific knowledge, method, and how scientific 
knowledge grows. Although these thinkers did not have exactly the same 
views about science as demonstrated in their criticism of one another’s views, 
they nonetheless demonstrated a critical awareness of the various methological 






positivist outlook (see Staley, 2014: 1-85). This is the case because 
contemporary scientific enquiry often makes us believe that whatever is not 
measurable cannot be investigated, and eventually its existence and 
significance are remote. In that case, science is ill-equipped to address human 
experiences such as sorrow and joy and suffering and love. This failure which 
results from methodological inadequacies, and probably from sheer arrogance, 
does not mean such human experiences are useless. Actually they form an 
important dimension of human existence whose access requires different 
methods. The progress in science is akin to the Socratic technique in the sense 
which it portrays the mind’s flexibility to change about what to believe in face 
of new evidence which contradicts its earlier beliefs. Thus, characteristic of 
general philosophical outlook, knowledge grows by permanent examination of 
beliefs. In his engagement with important questions, Socrates focused 
primarily on the “cosmos” within human beings, opening up new realms of 
self-knowledge, while at the same time exposing a great deal of human error, 
superstition, vanity, pride and dogmatic nonsense immanent in ordinary 
beliefs. 
The Socratic method offers an opportunity for people to turn against their own 
long held dogmatism. This self-criticism has a liberating force. It frees one 
from one’s long and firmly held opinions, as well as opinions of others which 
cannot be substantiated. As Vlastos (1982: 711). explains, “this mode of 
argument is a potent instrument for exposing inconsistency within the 
interlocutor's beliefs.” Dialogue in all its forms compels us to explore 
alternative perspectives, asking what might be said for or against each of those 
perspectives. For Rob Reich (1998: 69),  
The elenchus lies at the heart of the Socratic method, for it was 
through refuting or cross-examining people that Socrates aimed 
to shame them into a recognition that their beliefs were false and 
in need of revision. Application of the elenchus thereby drew 
Socrates’ interlocutors into common inquiry; it cleansed them of 
the cobwebs of false belief that clutter reason. Elenctic 
questioning breaks down in order to build up. The mechanism of 
the elenchus is straightforward. It works by probing each 
response of an interlocutor, examining whether the entire set of 





beliefs held by a person is mutually consistent. The natural 
outcome of the elenchus is aporia, or confusion. Upon being 
refuted, the interlocutors can no longer maintain what they 
originally believed and are left, typically, in a state of utter 
perplexity.  
From Reich’s statement one gets the idea that Socratic elenchus is destructive 
as well as constructive. This dialogue is both corrosive as well as therapeutic 
in the sense that the process bruises one’s intellectual ego, but also makes one 
feel enlightened after discovering oneself.  
In many respects, the process of the Socratic dialogue is also akin to the will to 
power which is a key concept in Friedrich Nietzsche’s moral and political 
philosophy. Taking a critical orientation, Nietzsche’s aim is to free people 
from what he regards as their false consciousness about culture and morality 
which consists in the belief that this morality is good for them (see Williams 
2001). Nietzsche’s stance on morality is anti-realist.  Since morality is 
considered from the view of values, Nietzsche argues that there are no moral 
facts, and there is nothing in nature that has value in itself. For example, to 
speak of good or evil is to speak of human illusions, of lies according to which 
we find it necessary to live. Hence, what a human being does is to supplement 
reality by an ideal world of his own creation, a world of fantasy. Nietzsche is 
then challenging the very idea of the moral code. All concepts are human 
inventions, and all concepts are ultimately the expression of some form of will 
or other. Accepting these concepts means surrendering one’s will to the wills 
of those who framed them. He therefore encourages people to reject any 
imposition of concepts on them, and exercise their independence and 
creativity to develop their own values from which they will see the world 
(Geus, 2011: 19; Clark, 2015: 99). In this regard, both Socrates and Nietzsche 
promote a critical outlook on ideas people have long held to be true, although 
their approaches differ significantly. Those ideas can originate from oneself or 
the society. In the Socratic elenchus, one is patiently led to the discovery of 
the inadequacies of the ideas one holds to be true, while Nietzsche is straight, 
more direct and unambiguous when he encourages people to reject the moral 






Not everyone agrees with the Socratic elenchus both as a philosophy and its 
attendant method. There are objections to its use as a genuine tool for 
knowledge. The fact that more often than not the elenchus process results in 
aporia or confusion of some sort with Socrates seemingly bent on critiquing 
all possible proposals for answers without an indication of what might be the 
correct one, renders its usefulness problematic to many people (Vlastos, 1982: 
7). It is the aporia, the absurdity, which enables one to reconsider his earlier 
position which is however more important for innovation. The absurdity of 
earlier answers keeps the mind alert as it no longer takes any suggestion for 
granted as the final answer. Reich has suggested a Socratic method that 
detaches from truth as the desired goal or outcome that serves contemporary 
knowledge process best. The process is more important than the result. Reich 
emphasizes this point: “in contrast to most other great thinkers, Socrates’ 
primary legacy is not a contribution to humanity’s storehouse of knowledge, 
but a pedagogy; not substance but process. To overstate only slightly, for 
Socrates, and for our understanding of him, method is all” (Reich, 1998: 68). 
Socrates is eternally skeptical of any claim to possessing absolute and eternal 
knowledge. All knowledge is fallible and is open to future revision. Every 
truth claim is open to review (Reich, 1998: 75). That openness is crucial. The 
elenchus widens one’s mind through dialogue. It is not about facts but 
improving and discovering ourselves  as humans, and enhancing our 
understanding, our potential and capabilities. The mind is animated to think 
over the content critically and find its own answer through questions and 
investigations. That is the point. 
3. Knowledge and the contemporary development paradigm 
There are at least four theories of development, and these are modernisation, 
dependency, world-systems, and globalization. The dominant discourse of 
development or the prevailing vision of development in the contemporary 
world is that which considers development from the point of view of the 
modernization theory rooted in capitalism. To develop means to become 
modern (Matunhu, 2011: 65). In many ways it reflects the Western idea of 
modernity encompassing change in a variety of aspects of the human 
condition.  Development is therefore associated with the development of 
capitalist social relations which are historically conditioned (Przeworski & 





Limongi, 1997: 156). In Development Studies, a specialized sphere of 
knowledge dedicated to issues surrounding development, economic 
development is the most dominant perspective, although development as 
economics is just an aspect of the larger multi-dimensional notion of 
development (Sumner, 2006: 645). For Dudley Seers (1969: 3), development 
is “inevitably treated as a normative concept, as almost a synonym for 
improvement.” The low standard of living of the mass of the population in 
developing countries has been singled out as the key issue in development 
(Szirmai, 2005: 1). Similarly, the normative point of departure in 
Development Studies is that of improving people's lives, seeking to change or 
at least to do something good. Thus development intervenes in the lives of 
people while it often claims to know what is good for the ‘Other’ (Sumner, 
2007: 59).  
In recent times, development has assumed a limited meaning especially 
deduced from the practice of development agencies which aim at reducing 
poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals. The vision of the 
liberation of people, which animated development practice in the 1950s and 
1960s has thus been replaced by a vision of the liberalization of economies 
(Sumner & Tribe, 2008: 9). Accumulation of material wealth is considered as 
the good since it enables change from material poverty to material 
development (Sumner & Tribe, 2008: 10). Understood in that way, poverty 
reduction is considered as good change, and therefore the single most 
important objective for development which can be achieved through material 
wealth accumulation. However, goodness is not an ordinary concept. To ask 
what it is to be good is to enter the realm of value systems. That is, goodness 
is a value-laden concept. 
The idea that development consists of change from material poverty to 
material accumulation has been considered by other scholars as inadequate. 
The dimensions of development are extremely diverse to be reduced to a 
single knowledge sphere. Development dimensions include economic, social, 
political, legal and institutional structures, technology in its various forms 
(including the physical or natural sciences, engineering and communications), 
the environment, religion, the arts and culture, among others (Sumner & Tribe, 






contours of thinking about development. This change was necessitated by the 
works of such thinkers as Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum and others 
(Sumner & Tribe, 2008: 22). Sen, for example, focused on the capabilities 
approach to development, which consists of the means, opportunities or 
substantive freedoms which permit the achievement of a set of ‘functionings’. 
These functionings are ‘things’ which human beings value in terms of ‘being’ 
and ‘doing’. This, according to Sen, is the essence of Human Development. 
Thus, in his Development as Freedom (1999), Sen considers development as 
an exercise of freedom, a remarkable shift from goods to human beings. 
Indeed, this is the shift in focus from the material improvement of human lives 
to the human capability to do so. The end of every aspect of development is 
freedom. Sen is convinced human beings are likely to have sustainable 
development if development is conceived as human freedom.  This view is 
contrasted with the narrower view which consists in identifying development 
with the growth of gross national product or with the rise of personal incomes, 
industrialization or technological advancement, or indeed with social 
modernisation. For Sen therefore, development is an integrated process of 
expansion of substantive freedoms. Specific aspects of development such as 
economic growth, technological advancement and political change are all to 
be valued in the light of their contributions to the expansion of human 
freedoms. Among the most important of these freedoms are freedom from 
famine and malnutrition, freedom from poverty, access to health care and 
freedom from premature mortality (Sen, 1999: 3). Understood in this way, 
freedoms effectively become the primary ends of development as well as 
among its principal means (Sen, 1999: 10).  
In this regard, Sen is duly recognized by others in the field as having had a 
major intellectual influence on the framing of capability approaches to 
development as a human development, although not all aspects of his theory 
are taken aboard (Nussbaum, 2011: 17). Nussbaum uses the plural 
‘capabilities’ in order to drive home her point that the most important 
elements of people’s quality of life are plural and qualitatively distinct, 
namely “health, bodily integrity, education, and other aspects of individual 
lives cannot be reduced to a single metric without distortion” (Nussbaum, 
2011: 18). Thus, Sen and Nussbaum’s proposition serves to underscore 
Andrew Sumner’s misgivings about the concept of development where values 





are central to its definition. Value disputes with regard to development extend 
to questions of what it is that must be improved, how to improve it and, 
especially, the question of who decides. This is the case given the fact that for 
much of the period after the Second World War development has been defined 
in terms of a long-term view with an emphasis on socio-economic structural 
transformation, especially the global shift from an agrarian economy to an 
industrial economy (Sumner, 2008: 25).   
4. Economic prosperity as the epistemological basis of development  
There is no doubt education plays an important role in almost all spheres of 
human life. Information is such a basic resource that almost all activities in the 
contemporary age, which is called the information age, are knowledge-related. 
This is in stark contrast to activities of the industrial age that focused on 
physical functioning. Without information and knowledge, nothing has 
meaning as material will be formless, and motion is aimless. Information is 
essential for planning, directing and monitoring purposive activities of 
organisms and organizations (Oettinger, 1980: 192). On its part, education is 
an activity which enriches people’s understanding of themselves and the world 
(Ozturk, 2001: 39). For R.S. Peters (2010: 4-5), the criteria of ‘being 
educated’ as an achievement has to do with knowledge and understanding. 
Being educated implies the possession of relevant knowledge. In our modern 
day, knowledge economy is coined to reflect the increased importance of 
knowledge in economic development. In knowledge economy, emphasis is 
laid on the acquisition, creation, dissemination, and use of knowledge for 
greater economic and social development (Chen & Dahlman, 2004: 9).  
Although not so reliable, there is correlational evidence suggesting that 
education and economic growth are related. Policy makers often suggest that 
spending more on education leads to sufficient growth of income, usually 
more than the initial investment. Education is generally considered as a 
prerequisite for development which is itself a condition for good life. Thus, 
the significance of education is even more pronounced in development, 
especially when we consider the role of development as that of providing good 
life. Besides, education has become a very huge industry serving other 






an audacious and unambiguous claim about the role of education in economic 
development. He says, “No country has achieved sustained economic 
development without substantial investment in human capital” (Ramcharan, 
2002: 1). For him, the hallmark of the development process is the utilization of 
different types of skilled labour in the production process. That is how 
education can facilitate economic development. The World Bank agrees 
saying: “Knowledge is like light. Weightless and intangible, it can travel the 
world, enlightening the lives of people everywhere” (World Bank, 1998: 1). 
For individuals as well as countries, education is used for creating, adapting, 
and spreading knowledge (World Bank, 1998: 40). 
While some aspects of education are specialized in the construction of theories 
with which to understand human beings and their world, others are committed 
to fostering practical knowledge for technological innovations that serve the 
material needs of human beings. Although these two examples of knowledge 
orientations are somewhat different in content and method, they are not 
unrelated. Their relation is complementary. Contrary to the theoretical 
literature which has largely treated human capital as a homogenous concept, 
Ramcharan (2002. 3) thinks that each sphere of knowledge provides a skill 
that performs a specific but complementary function within the production 
process in the skilled sector. Education curricula will purposely be developed 
to produce knowledge that will specifically enhance the fulfilment of 
particular and desired goals. When development is considered from the point 
of view of economic growth for instance, where poverty is a non-
development, and affluence development, a specific education that produces 
relevant knowledge to enhance this will be promoted. In this case the 
production process of materials can directly be enhanced by the skilled labour. 
It is on this basis that Ramcharan (2002: 3)says that the dominant theoretical 
framework has largely treated human capital as a homogenous concept, yet 
this is not the case. Indeed, each knowledge sphere meets a particular need 
within the production process. The relevance of each knowledge discipline is 
determined by what it can do within that complementary role. For example an 
artist will develop the mental picture of what a physical object might look like 
in principle. This is often referred to as the artistic impression which involves 
a great deal of mental operations such as imagination which brings about a 
concept. However, it will require skilled people to interpret and actualize the 





artistic impression in the real world. It is a grave error therefore to think that 
every discipline of knowledge be validated empirically and practically by 
solving immediate human problems. 
The problem of development has been re-ignited by the needless intervention 
of state politics into the already age-old politics of knowledge. In the first 
place, the world of knowledge is full of hierarchies that are manifested in 
different ways. Different forms and domains of knowledge are endowed with 
unequal statuses. The natural sciences have always been considered as 
superior, occupying the top position, and the less ‘exact’ forms of knowledge 
such as those in the Arts and Humanities are relegated, and have had to settle 
for a position at the lower echelons of the hierarchy (Weiler, 2009: 486; 
Idachaba & Haaga, 2015: 35). The politics of knowledge is embedded in the 
question of economic utility. Thus, within the state, one type of knowledge is 
typically given priority over another and is accorded special standing and 
legitimacy (Weiler, 2009: 488). In our times, economic utility is so important 
that the creation of knowledge has come to be regarded and treated so 
pervasively in economic and commercial terms. The politics of production and 
profit are arguably the most powerful political dynamics in today’s world 
(Weiler, 2009: 489). Knowledge has become a commercial commodity whose 
value is in how it can turn around a nation’s economy. For this reason, the 
state deliberately prefers those areas of knowledge it considers have 
unquestionable potential to boost its economic development.  
Although lately there has been a shift in the perception of what development is 
all about, namely from simple accumulation of material wealth to the 
improvement of capabilities as is the case advanced by  Sen (1999) and  
Nussbaum (2011), the epistemological edifice on which such thinking is 
founded appears to remain firmly rooted in the more practical domain of 
knowledge. There is no doubt that development results from a particular type 
of education, where education is considered as a catalyst for economic 
success. The education system must therefore be consistent with the dominant 
development discourse. Within this education system, it is the disciplines that 
have the prospects of quantifiable results which are considered to be relevant. 
In Malawi for example, it is generally observed that from primary school 






practical aspects of the courses on offer. Those courses that appear to offer 
nothing in terms of such immediate expectations are forced to revise their 
focus in order to be consistent with the national development agenda. Their 
worth can only be considered in terms of how much of economic growth they 
manage to contribute. This is akin to what Dorothy Nampota lamented in her 
report Training teachers for secondary mathematics and science: The 
challenge facing University of Malawi where on the basis of the positive 
relationship between Science, Mathematics and Technology and development, 
she made a bold claim that “there is evidence that currently university 
curricula emphasise abstract concepts that have nothing to do with anything 
else”. She lamented the shortage of secondary school mathematics and science 
teachers by blaming other disciplines, in my wild speculation, the Arts and 
Humanities, which attract higher student enrolment (Nampota, 2007: 9).1  
This particular paradigm and its epistemological basis casts doubt over the 
worth of most if not all, the disciplines in the Arts and Humanities. It is for 
this reason that courses offered in these disciplines are today generally 
considered as worthless for their perceived lack of practical aspects required 
for facilitating economic development. Understood in that way, the campaign 
to have them removed from the education curriculum altogether has been 
relentless. To affirm the omnipresence of this kind of thinking, the Malawian 
school curriculum, especially at secondary level has on many occasions been 
tinkered with to make sure that science and technology become dominant. It is 
for this reason that today, students are forced to take scientific and 
technological courses at secondary level even though there is overwhelming 
evidence that some of the students themselves do not feel attracted to them. 
We can only speculate that there is an implicit requirement that everyone 
become a technologically oriented person.  
                                                          
1 http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/files/52556/11725003995Nampota.pdf/Nampota.pdf. I 
have always considered this complaint full of hot air, and I am very skeptical whether the 
veracity of such mythical statements can be demonstrated in light of nothingness of abstract 
concepts she so carelessly refers to. The question of nothingness referring to a piece of 
knowledge has an idea of value written all over its face. Values themselves are a matter of 
conventional consensus. It is not the case that specific piece of knowledge becomes everything 
or nothing by itself.  
 





Universal emphasis on material possession is partly responsible for the kind of 
thinking which sees development as essentially economic success. This is 
heavily entrenched in the capitalist system which exploits technological 
innovation for mass production of goods and services. This idea brings into 
question what development, education, as well as knowledge really mean to an 
individual in that context. However, it is clear that most Arts and Humanities 
disciplines do not proceed by question and a fixed answer method espoused by 
most scientific and technological domains. They rather look for an 
understanding. The kind of understanding that the Arts and Humanities seek 
cannot be said to be utterly worthless and devoid of any development aspect. 
When development, and education which produces knowledge, are 
approached in a holistic way, there can be no useless knowledge, and there is 
no aspect of knowledge that is irrelevant to development. The fact that 
development is about the whole human being, knowledge cannot be limited to 
scientific and technological domains alone. All aspects of knowledge are 
relevant in their respects. They serve different but complementary purposes. 
However, every researcher is inclined to think that his or her knowledge 
sphere is more fundamental than the other. Come to think of Mathematics, 
Language, Communication, Classics, History, Development Studies, or Law. 
They all claim to provide the world with fundamental knowledge. It is not 
wrong that scholars in those spheres think like that. To some extent one is 
justified in doing so for that is the only sphere one is conversant with. From 
the point of view of any researcher, his knowledge cannot be worthless. If a 
different development paradigm finds knowledge from another domain 
useless, the problem is not with the knowledge produced therein, but one’s 
narrow focus and the politically imposed focus on specific type of knowledge. 
That choice does not warrant to marginalize or indeed obliterate the perceived 
irrelevant disciplines. Quick techno-fixes do not solve enduring problems. 
Human beings do not only live for today, but also for posterity, even though 
they are inclined to prioritise the urgency of their current situations.  
The understanding that the Arts and Humanities seek by addressing specific 
questions is important in many ways. It is on this basis that the next section 
identifies and engages Critical Thinking as an aspect of knowledge that the 






thinking within development, economic development included. Specifically, it 
demonstrates the pedagogical and epistemological significance of Socrates’ 
elenchus, an archetype of critical thinking, in knowledge processes in the 21st 
century. 
5. The Socratic elenchus, knowledge processes and development 
This final section demonstrates how the Socratic elenchus, which is regarded 
as a prototype of critical thinking, a skill synonymous with the qualitative 
aspect of knowledge within the wider domains of the Arts and Humanities, is 
a sine qua non for the 21st century knowledge processes. Knowledge is critical 
for survival as well as for development. Although Socrates practised the 
elenchus about 2500 years ago, his methods of philosophising, and indeed of 
knowledge acquisition, have global relevance for a 21st century paradigm of 
learning and knowledge convergence. It is an approach to ‘knowledge 
building’ which still represents an effective remedy for the great challenges 
facing mankind (Richards, 2013: 32). Its ability to challenge long held 
opinions through criticism is relevant to the 21st century where there is a 
proliferation of information most of which parades as knowledge, and it 
becomes extremely difficult to make choices about that which should be 
trusted. Its ability to engage the mind in novel ways of thinking when it 
speculates about things not present in physical existence cannot be 
overemphasised. Many scholars recognize the value of critical thinking, 
claiming it is the most valuable skill students need to develop at all cost. 
Critical thinkers are usually open-minded, flexible, fair-minded in evaluation, 
honest in facing personal biases, prudent in making judgments (Robertson & 
Rane-Szostak, 1996: 552). Critical thinking competence consists of a shift 
from output to process, learning to thinking and subject isolation to subject 
integration of our education systems. Critical thinkers are intellectually 
curious about many things. They emphasise how to think rather than what to 
think (Thompson, 2011: 1-2). Although the Arts and Humanities primarily 
teach us how to think, critical thinking process broadens our horizon of 
imagination, reaching deeper insights concerning the ends or purpose of life. 
Accordingly, the ends or purpose of life are ultimately what matter to human 
existence as they make life a meaningful adventure. 





Globally, educational institutions are preoccupied with attempts to respond to 
the critical needs of the 21st century. Rightly so, educational institutions are 
challenged to respond to this and other societal needs. Critical thinking is 
considered as the most important skill for problem solving, inquiry and 
discovery. Questioning has been accepted among educators as an open-ended 
process of inquiry and a function of critical thinking (Thompson, 2011: 5). 
Critical thinking is the systematic approach to the skilful evaluation of 
information in order to arrive at the most feasible solution to a variety of 
problems. However, as a skill embedded in philosophical tradition, it is not 
everyone who believes in it that understands and knows how to go about it. Its 
popularity does not necessarily entail its intelligibility among scholars of 
various orientations in academic disciplines. One of the reasons is that critical 
thinking is a very abstract cognitive ability or skill. This characteristic puts it 
at a disadvantage because most people are interested in the outcome and not 
the process. However, critical thinking can be applied in almost all disciplines 
by posing searching questions, directing students to conduct independent 
research, encouraging them to question or challenge long held assertions, and 
then present their own fact-supported positions (Thompson, 2011: 1). 
The Socratic elenchus provides us with a prototype of critical thinking 
process. Because of its dialogical nature, critical thinking is also called the 
science of critique. Critique or analysis is a latent form of art. Its status as art 
is confirmed by its capacity to awaken and transform its participants and 
audience from their blind acceptance of dogma of many varieties. It engages 
issues that have not been sufficiently explored previously. Through criticism 
and creativity, the elenchus in itself can also be considered as a typical search 
for truth (Ohkusa, 2008: 47). In education, the role of Socrates in this process 
is similar to that of a midwife, while the student or learner remains the true 
parent of his or her own knowledge. The goals of Socrates were not merely to 
convince the student about his or her erroneous convictions, but to inculcate in 
the student the spirit of independence in search for authentic knowledge. 
Socrates believed that every human being has the capacity to understand 
things, and when he engaged students he believed that the power to discover 
the truth ultimately resides within students. Through criticism, students learn 






that can be adequately justified on rational grounds (Neumann Jr.,1989: 732). 
In the contemporary period which is characterized by excessive reliance on 
information, critical thinking becomes critical for survival. Students and other 
learners have to sift through large volumes of information in order to come up 
with their own authentic knowledge. In this regard Cameron Richards (2013: 
57).maintains that Socrates’ efforts to engage others and ‘society’ in general 
with questions represent more accurately an emergent knowledge-building 
model of how the most productive as well as universal ‘problem-solving’ 
requires humility in (a) engaging with the perpetual gap (or aporia) between 
‘what we know’ and ‘what we  don’t know’, and (b) transforming the 
negative trajectory and arrogance of close-minded ignorance into a more 
sustainable, productive and universally as well as ethically consistent 
trajectory (and inherently spiritual approach) of rather potentially wise 
‘ignorance.’  
One of the most important goals of critique is the development of creativity. 
Creativity entails the capacity to solve problems through insights that are 
arrived at independently and are considered novel (Neumann Jr., 1989: 744). 
Upon having their opinions refuted, the interlocutors can no longer maintain 
what they originally believed. From the state of utter perplexity and confusion, 
they enter a more important stage of curiosity and reflection, probing what 
might have gone wrong (Idachaba & Haaga, 2015: 35). In this state, students 
learn to seek new knowledge. It is the desire to seek new knowledge that is 
crucial. Socratic elenchus does not stop at aporia, the confusion which results 
from the absurdity of the rejected opinions. After such an absurdity, one 
begins to reconsider one’s position. Immediately the mind is called into action 
when it starts conceiving things differently. Innovation is a consequence of the 
mind’s operation of this kind. Innovation does not come because we wish it or 
because political authority says so. It is a rebuilding process of concepts by the 
mind after being hit by intellectual light. It is unthinkable that innovation, 
which has become synonymous with contemporary knowledge economy, will 
be possible without the ability for one to exercise critical thinking and 
application of imagination into the realms only reachable by the mind.2 
                                                          
2 Imagination is also critical in the development of moral knowledge. In this regard, Nussbaum 
(Nussbaum, 2010: xvii).has argued that literature as a form of art helps human beings to further 
public goals, especially improvement of their moral life. It is only through imagination, such as 





Innovation does not come from the fact that science and technology provide 
tangible results. Rather, the quantifiable results are a product of the 
enlightened mind. Those quantifiable results are not the end for which 
knowledge processes are carried out. 
The Socratic elenchus, as a way of thinking, can be applied to almost all 
spheres of human life. Indeed, human development in the 21st century is in 
need of the Socratic elenchus. Sen (1999) and Nussbaum (2011) have 
demonstrated this in their critique of the economic development paradigm. 
They have argued that it is not sufficient to make material provision of basic 
amenities to poverty-stricken societies. In his perceived poor state, a human 
being still has the dignity to make personal decisions. These two eminent 
scholars propose a capabilities approach to development. Thus the central 
feature of any developmental initiative must be to create conditions in which 
human beings are able to make and live by their own choices. Timothy L. 
Simpson has applied Socratic elenchus to democracy. He contends that eternal 
skepticism characteristic of the Socratic method is a primary virtue of the 
democratic citizens because it liberates citizens from strong commitment to 
their views and creates an opportunity for openness and dialogue with other 
viewpoints (Simpson, 2006: 140). This skepticism penetrates areas beyond the 
confines of individual beliefs. Citizen are able to doubt a broad range of 
beliefs, practices and traditions of any political regime (Simpson, 2006, p. 
141). The Socratic method can help students learn the critical thinking skills 
and develop habits necessary for political participation in a pluralist 
democracy (Reich, 1998: 75). Critical thinking then leads one to knowledge, 
understanding and empowerment. For Paul Giannakopoulos and Sheryl 
Buckley (2010: 330)., knowledge involves understanding of information. As 
information makes sense and it becomes useful to someone, it becomes 
knowledge. For Nussbaum (Nussbaum, 1997: 19), the flourishing and 
continuity of a liberal democratic society very much depends on the ability of 
students as well as the rest of citizens to reason “Socratically.” Socratic 
elenchus can also be used in communication. Just like the Platonic type, 
dialogues are the dominant form of communication. They appear every day 
                                                                                                                                           
the one gained through the study of literature, that one is able to experience the feelings of 






when human beings interact with each other. Effective dialogical interaction 
involves multiple skills, including the ability to converse with others, the skill 
of qualifying one's view, and the ability to elaborate and persuade others on 
our point of view (Robertson & Rane-Szostak, 1996: 552).  
6. Conclusion 
It is impossible in this short piece to outline all instances in which the Socratic 
elenchus can be of relevance to knowledge processes in the contemporary 
period. I believe, the few that I have so far considered adequately demonstrate 
the claim under consideration. It is more important to keep in mind, however, 
that, despite the frequent and persistent attempts to sideline the Arts and 
Humanities on political and economic grounds, the needs of the 21st century 
world present an opportunity in which these disciplines can only be ignored at 
one’s own peril. The Socratic elenchus provides the skills that epitomise 
critical thinking, which is itself, the core of the Arts and Humanities. 
However, critical thinking does not serve the Arts and Humanities alone. Its 
relevance cuts across multiple spheres of knowledge disciplines. This kind of 
knowledge or method of knowing and interacting with the universe cannot be 
deliberately ignored, preferring those which promise immediate and 
quantifiable practical results. This is not to underestimate the role that science 
and technology have played in transforming the material aspects of people’s 
lives. However, that transformation which has become synonymous with the 
scientific domains of knowledge cannot be meaningfully sustained when the 
mind which is tasked with the organisation of thoughts is not sharp enough or 
sufficiently trained to contend with large volumes of information. The 
development of a more sophisticated, astute, and alert mind is critical. Such a 
mind is more prepared, and so in tune, to confront and understand problems of 
the contemporary sophisticated universe, while at the same time providing 
innovative intellectual resources for the much needed solutions. Rather than 
antagonizing these disciplines on reasons lacking sufficient evidence and 
sound analysis, there is need to recognize the complementary role of various 
spheres of knowledge in human development. 
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